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Abstract 
This empirical paper analyses how leading international banking centres (IBCs) 
have been faring under the 2008 global financial crisis. We aggregate data 
derived from The Banker’s annual list of the world’s leading banks at the city 
level to map changing levels of Tier 1 capital between 2007 and 2008 and 
returns on capital in 2008. The results point to a general but nonetheless 
variegated shift ‘from West to East’ in the world of IBCs. The paper concludes 
with a brief review of the implications for future research on financial 
geographies in general and the geographies of the financial crisis in particular. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Asian cities are closing in on London and New York in a ranking of 
competitiveness among the world’s leading financial centres.’ This was the 
executive summary of the sixth edition of The Global Financial Centres Index 
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(GFCI), published in September 2009. The GFCI is produced twice yearly by 
the Z/Yen Group think-tank in association with the City of London Corporation, 
and rates major international financial centres in terms of ‘competitiveness’. The 
latter is calculated through a ‘factor assessment model’, which combines 
external indices such as office rents, airport satisfaction and tax rates with 
assessments based on responses to an online questionnaire. The September 
2009 GFCI reveals that Singapore and Hong Kong have managed to weather 
the financial storm better than most of their leading US and European 
counterparts (even to the degree that they are closing in on London and New 
York), while Shenzhen, Shanghai and Beijing have also substantially increased 
their ‘competitiveness’ during the financial crisis. Such observations are 
obviously in line with the anticipated geographical shift in the world-economy 
from ‘West’ to ‘East’ (e.g. Arrighi 1994; Frank 1998; Derudder et al. 2010): the 
financial crisis, it would seem, is acting as a major catalyst for a larger geo-
economic sea change.  
 
This ‘West to East’ reading of the financial crisis is also evident in a recent 
paper by Aalbers (2009). In his article ‘Geographies of the financial crisis’, 
Aalbers states that one of these geographies relates to the fact that  
 
we may also see a shift in the dominance of financial centres. The 
financial crisis does not directly lead to the fall of Wall Street (New York) 
and The City (London), but it does accelerate the trend towards a shift in 
financial centres. There are now more secondary financial centres in the 
world and the centres of increasing importance are to be found outside 
Northern America and Europe. (2009, 39) 
 
Aalbers points to the rise of Hong Kong, Dubai, Shanghai, Mumbai and 
Singapore, but stresses that there will also be uneven geographies within this 
‘rise of the East’ as factors such as quality of life and political stability are 
important. 
 
At the same time, however, this particular reading of the shifting geography of 
financial centres is met with considerable skepticism. The Banker, for instance, 
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the leading international financial affairs publication owned by The Financial 
Times, recently issued a press statement in which they emphasized that – 
amidst all apparent chaos and change – it was actually pretty much business as 
usual for the leading banks, and, therefore, the financial centres in which they 
are located: 
 
With so many banks requiring government help to shore up their capital 
base and many banks being forced to sell assets, some pundits (and 
banks) suspected that this year might see a seismic shift among the top 
ranks of the capital listing. Not so. Aside from three new entrants (…) the 
Top 25 is composed of much the same institutions as last year, 
dominated by Western banks with a sprinkling of Japanese and Chinese 
players. (The Banker 2009, 1) 
 
In their overview of the health of the world’s leading banks in 2008, The Banker 
does note the strong position of China. There are, for instance, five Chinese 
banks in the Top 25 by pre-tax profits, more than any other country (e.g. the 
Industrial Bank of China and China Construction Bank were the most profitable 
banks in 2008). But rather than seeing this Chinese ‘success’ as a sign of a 
large-scale shift in the geography of banking centres, The Banker notes that this 
uncharacteristic 2008 profitability should primarily be understood as a matter of 
sound banking rather than shifting economic and financial geographies: the 
profitable banks have been those that stuck to the basics of banking more than 
anything else – taking deposits and lending in their home markets. In other 
words, rather than an epochal shift in the geography of banking centres, The 
Banker suggests that – beyond a limited number of spectacular bankruptcies – 
stability has perhaps been the single most important feature of the geography of 
banks during the financial crisis. 
 
The purpose of this short empirical paper is to paint a more nuanced picture of 
how leading cities have been faring under the financial crisis. Because of the 
vagueness and complexity involved in the ‘international financial centres’ (IFCs) 
concept, we will focus on the more narrow but less blurry category of 
‘international banking centres’ (IBCs). To map changes in the geography of 
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IBCs, we use data on key indicators of the world’s leading banks for 2007 and 
2008. Rather than focusing on individual banks or the countries in which their 
headquarters are located, we aggregate indicators at the city-level to outline 
some key features of shifting IBC geographies.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next sections introduce 
the IBC definition employed in this paper and the datasets and the way in which 
these were transformed for the purposes of our analysis. We then outline the 
major patterns that emerge from the data analysis. The paper is concluded with 
a brief review of the implications for future research on financial geographies in 
general and the geographies of the financial crisis in particular. 
 
 
IFC/IBC geographies 
 
As indicated in the introduction, it is very difficult to operationalize the complex 
and variegated notion ‘international financial centre’ (IFC). In principle, IFCs 
represent the primary markets where finance capital and currency is collected, 
switched, disbursed and exchanged. In the last two decades, there has been a 
trend towards disintermediation in finance, which has put the importance of 
markets and investors to the fore. Because markets have largely become 
virtual, increasing shares of the day-to-day activities in IFCs are related to the 
management of hedge funds, private equity funds, pension funds, and assets 
rather than banking sensu strictu. More importantly, however, the spatiality of 
this diversification is uneven: cities such as Luxemburg and Dublin are 
dominated by investors, Amsterdam and Frankfurt are examples of centres 
dominated by banks, while London has a balanced share of both. To deal with 
this fuzziness, we restrict ourselves to one specific element of what makes a 
‘financial centre’, i.e. headquarters of leading banks in relation to key indicators 
of their overall performance. As a consequence, rather than dealing with shifting 
patterns in the geography of IFCs per se, in this paper we will focus on the more 
narrow but less blurry category of ‘international banking centres’ (IBCs).  
 
5 
 
The straightforward IBC definition we adopt in this paper, therefore, is that of an 
agglomeration of banking headquarter activities in a specific location. Although 
less ambiguous than any characterization of the IFC concept, this working 
definition of IBCs also entails a number of potential ambiguities because of 
differences in the scale and scope of the activities that occur within these 
locations. For instance, a bank head office does not necessarily involve a large 
amount of employment. Indeed, some head offices are merely holdings 
locations of banks that own most of their assets through foreign subsidiaries, 
make most of their revenue outside of their home country, and employ most of 
their staff in other economies1. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a number of scholars 
have developed typologies of IBCs. Tschoegl (2000) reviews these typologies, 
which collectively lead him to the conclusion that IBCs should essentially be 
viewed as highly competitive marketplaces rather than ‘command bunkers’. As 
he observes, 
 
with the exception perhaps of Tokyo, [there is no city with] headquarters 
of more than a handful of the world’s largest banks. At the same time, 
each of the largest centers is a host to branches or subsidiaries of almost 
all the world’s other major banks or financial firms. (Tschoegl 2000, 8) 
 
Furthermore, the straightforward focus on a specific location in space 
engendered by looking at head offices alone may obfuscate the complex 
spatialities of IBCs. As von Peter (2007) points out, the term ‘centre’ in principle 
also suggests a notion of space that emphasizes a position in relation to other 
locations. From this perspective, IBCs should be identified based on the 
position they occupy in relation to other locations. This would lead to a range of 
measures in which ‘size’ per se (however defined) is only one indicator of a 
banking centre’s multifaceted dimensions. Although the best connected and 
most central locations are generally also the largest centres, an important 
network position need not come with size. And even where such network 
measures coincide with size, as for most top-tier IBCs, they may well ‘help 
explain market share: a central position attracts deposits and the participation of 
foreign banks and thereby contributes to reported size’ (von Peter 2007, 43). 
Although these observations remind us of the complexity of the conceptual and 
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empirical associations between size, connectivity and headquarter 
functionalities, the fact that these are somehow functionally connected 
(especially in leading IBCs) also implies that an analysis of key performance 
indicators of leading banks in relation to their headquarter location may shed 
light on the geography of IBCs. 
 
 
The Banker 1000 data set 
 
In this paper, we use data derived from The Banker’s well-known annual list of 
the world’s leading banks2. Here we use the data reported in the July 2008 and 
July 2009 issues, which summarize the 2007 and 2008 performances of the 
world’s leading banks respectively3. For each year, the selection of banks is 
based on the level of Tier 1 capital, but the dataset also contains myriad other 
measures of bank strength and performance.  
 
The use of the level of Tier 1 capital for selecting banks is a logical choice in the 
world of finance, as this is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from 
a regulator’s point of view. Tier 1 capital is the shareholders’ equity available to 
cover actual or potential losses. It is composed of core capital, which consists 
primarily of common stock, disclosed reserves and retained earnings, but 
excludes cumulative preference shares, revaluation reserves, hidden reserves, 
and subordinated and other long-term debt. There are, however, two potential 
problems when using (changing levels of) Tier 1 capital to assess the impact of 
the financial crisis. 
 
The first potential problem is an empirical problem. The way in which Tier 1 is 
calculated may differ as each of the national banking regulators has some 
discretion over how to count differing financial instruments in a capital 
calculation. For instance, depending on the legal framework, Tier 1 capital may 
also include (parts of) a bank’s ‘goodwill’, an intangible asset that reflects the 
difference between the market value and selling price of a bank. In the pre-crisis 
era, goodwill was commonly deducted from Tier 1 as it does not have much (if 
any) liquidation value and cannot be sold by itself. In the course of the financial 
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crisis, however, a number of regulators changed accounting rules so that (some 
of) the goodwill could count toward Tier 1 capital, thus helping banks toward 
meeting their regulatory capital requirements. As a consequence, Tier 1 
calculations are open to some degree of political manipulation. To circumvent 
this and other possible multiplicities, The Banker uses a singular 
characterization of Tier 1 capital and other indicators of a bank’s financial 
prowess such as assets, pre-tax profits, and profit-on-capital ratio4. 
 
The second potential problem is a conceptual one, and is related to the fact that 
Tier 1 capital is neither an unambiguous measure of ‘size’ nor are its changing 
levels unambiguously related to the crisis. Although the selection of the ‘Top 
1000’ banks was based on their level of Tier 1 capital, it is quite difficult to 
simply equate this indicator with ‘size’ per se. In reality, ‘big banks’ have large 
assets, encompassing different markets and connecting different economies. 
Bank of America, for instance, ranked 1st in the 2007 edition of The Banker in 
terms of Tier 1 capital, is ranked only 10th in terms of asset size. Furthermore, 
as a dynamic solvability measure, changing levels of Tier 1 are ambiguously 
related to the crisis: declining solvability, for instance, can be both a sign of a 
bank’s weakness (e.g. declining liquidity levels that ultimately resulted in 
solvability problems for RBS and Fortis after the ABN AMRO takeover) and of 
strength (e.g., the forced takeover of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America)5. 
However, at the city level these differences between Tier 1 capital and assets 
are not empirically that important: a simple ecological correlation between both 
measures results in a very high correlation (i.e above 0.9). Thus below we 
follow The Banker’s lead and use Tier 1 capital for our comparisons. 
 
Our basic approach in this paper is to aggregate these key indicators at the 
level of individual cities for both datasets. Comparing these measures for 2007 
and 2008 allows us to assess the heterogeneous impact of the 2008 financial 
crisis on IBCs beyond a simple review of spectacular but highly specific events 
such as bankruptcies and mergers & acquisitions. To make the different 
measurements comparable and exclude idiosyncratic results, a number of 
decisions regarding data handling needed to be made. First, we had to exclude 
a number of (predominantly small) banks from the analysis because they 
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reported the same data for both years. Second, we systematically checked the 
headquarter locations in the dataset because some ‘cities’ referred to specific 
parts of major cities (e.g. Giza for Cairo and Midrand for Johannesburg) and/or 
some cities were listed under a different name (e.g. Mandaluyong City and 
Makati City for Manila). If and when appropriate, headquarter locations were 
relabeled to enforce a coherent geographical setting6. Third, indicators were 
aggregated at the city-level, after which we only retained cities that met at least 
one of two criteria: (i) cities with three or more headquarters in at least one of 
the datasets (thus including cities such as Reykjavik, which had three bank 
headquarters in the 2007 data but none in the 2008 data) and (ii) cities that rank 
in the top 25 in terms of Tier 1 capital in at least one of the datasets (thus 
including cities such as Edinburgh, which only houses two headquarters, albeit 
of very big banks). This resulted in a roster of 99 cities for further analysis. 
However, for reasons of clarity, our discussion will focus on those 52 cities that 
represent at least 5% of the level of Tier 1 capital of the most dominant city in 
one of the datasets (Paris in 2007 and New York in 2008). In the next section, 
we outline the major findings of our analysis. 
 
 
Changing geographies of IBCs 
 
Tier 1 changes between 2007 and 2008 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the major changes in the level of Tier 1 capital 
between 2007 and 2008. The table lists the 15 largest positive and negative 
changes, the figure maps Tier 1 change for each of the 52 cities.  
 
Table 1 Largest changes in Tier 1 level 
Largest positive 
change in Tier 1 
(%) 
Largest 
negative 
change in Tier 1 
(%) 
1  San Francisco  117,40  1  Reykjavik  ‐100,00 
2  New York  89,23  2  Winston‐Salem  ‐74,44 
3  Singapore  45,84  3  Seoul  ‐30,35 
4  Charlotte  44,91  4  Manama  ‐20,94 
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5  Abu Dhabi  40,63  5  Munich  ‐13,44 
6  Minneapolis  37,79  6  Barcelona  ‐12,67 
7  Beijing  33,50  7  St Petersburg  ‐11,99 
8  Mumbai  25,14  8  Istanbul  ‐9,05 
9  Shanghai  24,39  9  London  ‐7,83 
10  Dubai  22,64  10  Dublin  ‐7,76 
11  Bangkok  19,16  11  Stuttgart  ‐6,78 
12  Athens  13,73  12  Tokyo  ‐5,33 
13  Kuala Lumpur  13,14  13  Brussels  ‐5,20 
14  Sydney  12,95  14  Edinburgh  ‐5,14 
15  Melbourne  12,75  15  Kuwait  ‐5,11 
 
Figure 1 Largest changes in Tier 1 level (The Banker 2008 and 2009) 
 
 
The largest positive changes can be found in San Francisco, New York, 
Singapore, Charlotte and Abu Dhabi respectively. The most notable negative 
changes, in turn, can be found in Reykjavik, Winston-Salem, Seoul, Munich and 
Manama. In some instances, these patterns of growth and decline are directly 
interrelated. The decline of Winston-Salem, for instance, can be attributed to the 
government-forced sale of Wachovia to avoid this bank’s failure. Initially ranked 
19th, the bank was purchased by San Francisco-headquartered Wells Fargo on 
31 December 2008, so that the growth of San Francisco directly mirrors the 
decline of Winston-Salem. The near-doubling of Tier 1 capital in New York, in 
turn, is primarily due to the forced entry of New York-based investment banks in 
The Banker’s list (in addition to the takeover of Washington Mutual by Morgan 
Chase): after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, erstwhile investment banks 
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Goldman Sachs (ranked 13 in 2008) and Morgan Stanley (ranked 17 in 2008) 
were forced to become traditional bank holding companies from 22 September 
2008 onwards. And finally, the rise of Charlotte can be traced back to the Merrill 
Lynch acquisition by Bank of America.  
 
Other notable patterns include the strong showing of Abu Dhabi and Singapore: 
all banks headquartered in both cities reported strong growth figures. Seoul 
banks, in contrast, uniformly posted bad figures, while Munich’s position as an 
IBC has suffered immensely under the quasi-collapse of two of its largest banks 
(Bayerische Landesbank and Hypo Real Estate). Reykjavik, in turn, is no longer 
on the map of international finance after the collapse of all three of the city’s 
major banks (Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir) following their difficulties in 
refinancing their short-term debt and a run on deposits in the United Kingdom. 
 
Taken together, the figure and the table clearly show that the most notable 
spatial pattern is the general decline of European cities: the only non-European 
cities recording a drop in Tier 1 capital are Winston-Salem, Seoul, Tokyo and 
Manama. Conversely, Athens is the only European city in the top 15 cities in 
terms of positive Tier 1 capital change. However, this Athens exception simply 
points to a delayed reaction to the financial crisis: the major Athens-
headquartered banks (National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and Piraeus) 
managed to record healthy performance throughout 2008 because of strong 
credit demand in Greece. However, just before the end of the year (11 
December 2008), Moody’s Investors Service suddenly changed the outlook on 
these banks’ financial strength ratings and long-term deposit and debt ratings to 
negative from stable. Thus Athens  followed the path of other European cities 
shortly after the data gathering, and now finds itself in an even worse position 
as IBC.   
 
Most of the banks in the Middle Eastern centres have fared relatively well under 
the crisis with the exception of Manama. However, it can be noted that the city’s 
smaller banks – like most of their Middle Eastern counterparts – have actually 
had a good year in 2008, but their core capital gains are offset by the Tier 1 
losses of Gulf International Bank. The latter bank is by far the largest Manama-
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based financial institution, and the forced sale of a significant portion of its 
noncore international securities portfolio was enough to let Manama’s level of 
core capital take a nosedive.  
 
 
Pre-tax profit performance in 2008 
 
Although banks’ profits and losses are volatile in time and space, aggregated 
levels of 2008 profits provide us with another and perhaps more forthright 
forecast of how the landscape of IBCs will be changing under the crisis. Table 2 
and Figure 2 summarize aggregated pre-tax profits at the city-level. To properly 
contextualize these profits/losses, they are presented as relative measures to 
the level of Tier 1 capital contained within a city, thus generating a ‘return on 
capital’ ratio. The table lists the 15 centres with the highest levels of return on 
capital and the 13 cities that posted the largest average losses. Note that the 
map no longer features Reykjavik, as the city’s banks have been wiped out in 
2008.   
 
Table 2 Largest pre-tax profits/losses in 2008 (The Banker 2009) 
Largest pretax 
profits/Tier 1 
2009 (%) 
Largest 
pretax 
losses/Tier 1 
2009 (%) 
1  Sydney  29,9  1  Munich  ‐57,6 
2  Johannesburg  29,8  2  Edinburgh  ‐57,4 
3  Shanghai  28,0  3  San Francisco  ‐49,2 
4  Kuala Lumpur  24,6  4  Zurich  ‐41,4 
5  Kuwait  23,8  5  Brussels  ‐35,3 
6  Beijing  23,5  6  Salt Lake City  ‐32,8 
7  Santander  23,4  7  Stuttgart  ‐20,3 
8  Montreal  21,5  8  Frankfurt  ‐16,0 
9  Riyadh  20,6  9  New York  ‐11,1 
10  Stockholm  19,8  10  Amsterdam  ‐4,6 
11  Istanbul  18,5  11  Manama  ‐3,6 
12  Bangkok  17,6  12  Tokyo  ‐2,1 
13  Mumbai  17,0  13  Copenhagen  ‐0,5 
14  Melbourne  16,1  14 
15  Minneapolis  16,1  15 
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Figure 2 Largest pre-tax profits/losses in 2008 (The Banker 2009) 
 
 
The five cities atop this ranking are Sydney, Johannesburg, Shanghai, Kuala 
Lumpur and Kuwait. With levels of return on capital of over 25%, the banks 
located in these cities have continued to perform at pre-crisis levels (or even 
better). The observation that for banks located in these cities 2008 has been 
pretty much ‘business as usual’ in terms of profitability is confirmed when 
looking at individual banks: it is remarkable how virtually all of the banks located 
in these cities post pre-tax profit levels that are in line with 2007 results. In other 
words: the large profits of banks that have their headquarters in these cities are 
not so much the result of one or two exceptional results, but rather the product 
of an overarching stability in the performance of key financial institutions in 
these cities.   
 
The five cities representing the largest losses (in addition to Reykjavik’s demise) 
are Munich, Edinburgh, San Francisco, Zurich and Brussels. Munich’s banks 
(especially Bayerische Landesbank and Hypo Real Estate) posted losses of 
almost 50% of their core capital, which confirms the city’s decline as an IBC. In 
absolute terms, however, the worst losses were for Edinburgh and San 
Francisco-based banks, with Royal Bank of Scotland and Wells Fargo posting 
staggering 59.3 billion and 47.7 billion US$ losses respectively.  
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If pre-tax profits are heralding fundamental changes in the geography of 
banking centres, then Figure 2 can indeed be read as a ‘West to East’ shift. 
Manama and Tokyo are the only cities posting (relatively small) net losses in 
2008, as all other losses (and especially the larger ones) are associated with 
cities in Europe and the US. Notable exceptions are the losses posted by banks 
headquartered in Stockholm, Istanbul and especially Santander. Although 
Santander houses more than one headquarter of a top 1000 bank (i.e. Caja 
Cantabria), its position as an IBC is almost exclusively tied to the activities of 
Banco Santander (Spain’s biggest bank, and in terms of market capitalization 
now also Europe’s biggest bank). Banco Santander was the only partner that 
did not suffer from liquidity problems after the ABN AMRO takeover, in contrast 
to the Edinburgh-headquartered Royal Bank of Scotland and Brussels-
headquartered Fortis which had to be bailed out by their respective states due 
to credit shortage. Banco Santander, however, secured the takeover of ABN 
AMRO-owned Brazilian bank Banco Real without running into liquidity 
problems, and in addition acquired Sovereign Bancorp (US), Alliance & 
Leicester (UK) and parts of savings bank Bradford & Bingley (UK).  
 
 
Typology of IBCs under the crisis 
 
Our overview of Tier changes between 2007 and 2008, and pre-tax profits in 
2008, has shown that the IBC changes under the financial crisis are varied in 
geographical and substantive terms. Geographically, one can hardly speak of a 
large-scale ‘West to East’ shift given, for instance, the performance of 
Montreal/Toronto banks compared to Seoul/Manama banks. Furthermore, when 
comparing the figures and tables for both indicators and interpreting them in the 
light of the variegated meaning of changing Tier 1 levels (see above), it 
becomes clear that the impact of the crisis is also wide-ranging in terms of its 
effects. For instance, while the Wachovia-takeover by Wells Fargo boosts the 
Tier 1 level of San Francisco and marks the decline of Winston-Salem as a 
banking centre, it is obvious that it would be wrong to interpret 2008 as a ‘good 
year’ for San Francisco. On average, San Francisco banks posted losses that 
are over 20% of average Tier 1 levels, which implies that – in spite of enormous 
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Tier 1 growth – the long term outlook of San Francisco as an IBC is perhaps 
less secure than before the crisis. Similarly, Kuwait-headquartered banks have 
managed to uphold their profitability during the crisis, but this does not entail a 
general rise of Kuwait as an IBC as the total level of core capital has lessened. 
In other words, a balanced appraisal of the impact of the financial crisis implies 
a combined appraisal of performance indicators.  
 
To this end, Table 3 presents a typology that combines both the results for Tier 
1 change between 2007 and 2008 and pre-tax profits in 2008. We distinguish 
three levels of Tier 1 change (gain, stability, loss) and four levels of return on 
capital (large profits, small profits, small losses, large losses). The 20% 
threshold for pre-tax profitability is based on the Banker’s (2009) assessment 
that in pre-crisis years return on capital was on average close to this level. In 
Figure 3, this typology is combined with levels of Tier 1 capital in 2008 to create 
a summarizing geography of IBCs in the context of the crisis. 
 
Table 3 A typology of international banking centres in the context of the financial 
crisis 
 
% 
Change 
in Tier 1 
Profits/Tier 1 2009 
>20%  0 to 20%  ‐20% to 0%  <‐20% 
>5% 
 
Sydney, Shanghai, 
Kuala Lumpur, 
Beijing, Santander 
Montreal, Riyadh 
Bangkok, 
Mumbai, 
Melbourne, 
Minneapolis, 
Singapore, Dubai, 
Athens, Abu 
Dhabi, Toronto, 
Taipei, Charlotte, 
Tel Aviv 
New York  Zurich, San 
Francisco 
‐5% to 
5% 
 
Johannesburg 
Stockholm, 
Madrid, Lisbon, 
Sao Paulo, Milan, 
Moscow, Paris, 
Utrecht, Vienna, 
Copenhagen, 
Amsterdam, 
Frankfurt 
Salt Lake City 
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Dusseldorf 
<‐5%  Kuwait 
Istanbul, 
Barcelona, 
Winston‐Salem, 
Dublin, London, 
Seoul, St 
Petersburg 
Tokyo, Manama 
Stuttgart, 
Brussels, 
Edinburgh, 
Munich 
 
  Big winners 
  Winners 
  Mixed 
  Losers 
  Big Losers 
 
Figure 3 A typology of international banking centres in the context of the 
financial crisis 
 
 
Taken together, the table and the figure reveal the complexity of the geography 
of IBC performance. There a number of obvious winners and losers: Sydney, 
Shanghai, Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, Santander, Montreal, Riyadh are clear-cut 
winners in that they combine pre-crisis levels of return on capital with Tier 1 
growth. Moreover, it should be emphasized that – in general – in these 
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instances capital growth has been less government-based than the results of 
the banks’ own efforts to raise their capital (in contrast to the Tier 1 growth of 
most US and European-based banks). Unambiguous losers are the European 
centres of Edinburgh, Brussels, Stuttgart and Munich: in spite of capital 
injections by governments, capital levels have plummeted, while future recovery 
of these cities as IBCs is uncertain given the enormous losses.  Most IBCs 
feature in the grey zone of centres that exhibit mixed results. For instance, cities 
such as New York, Stockholm, Frankfurt and Istanbul couple a relative stability 
in terms of Tier 1 capital with a relatively ‘flat’ year in terms of profitability. And 
finally, the remaining cities such as Bangkok/Johannesburg and Salt Lake 
City/Tokyo are relative winners/losers in that they combine a relatively good/bad 
performance on one the key indicators with a mediocre performance for the 
other indicator (e.g., Salt Lake City banks combining Tier 1 stability with large 
losses and Johannesburg banks combining Tier 1 stability with large profits).    
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
In this paper, we have aimed to paint a more detailed picture of the impact of 
the financial crisis on IBCs. Based on an appraisal of a combination of different 
key indicators (change in core capital and return on capital), we have shown 
that the geographical impact of the crisis is not simply a matter of a shift ‘from 
West to East’. Although most clear-cut winners are indeed located outside 
Northern America and Europe as suggested by Aalbers (2009), a number of 
Western centres such as Sydney and Santander are amongst the IBCs with the 
strongest performing banks in the unfolding crisis. Similarly, a number of Middle 
Eastern and Pacific Asian banks have gone against the overarching regional 
trend and have been dragged down by the crisis. Thus although Abu Dhabi, 
Riyadh and Dubai on the one hand and Beijing, Shanghai and Kuala Lumpur on 
the other hand managed to weather the storm because of the strong 
performance of banks headquartered in these cities in the period under 
investigation, one can also note the relative poor showing of Kuwait/Manama 
and Seoul/Tokyo.  
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This systematic account of shifting IBC geographies obviously implies that other 
financial practices remain unassessed: our analysis has focused on just one 
element of what defines a financial centre. Furthermore, there are, as Engelen 
and Faulconbridge (2009), Lee et al. (2009), Aalbers (2009) and Klagge (2009) 
have recently highlighted, a large number of geographical puzzles associated 
with the credit crisis, and geographers are in principle well-positioned to provide 
nuanced accounts of the crisis (e.g., Hallsworth and Skinner 2008). With 
respect to this broader financial geography, we see three pertinent research 
agendas that may further inform the empirical analysis presented in this paper. 
 
First, the prominent role of governments raises a number of questions with 
respect to the role of the state in IBC-formation. The near-collapse of major 
Belgian banks Fortis and Dexia entailed intense discussions and negotiations 
between the Belgian and the Dutch governments on the one hand and the 
Belgian and the French governments on the other hand. On both occasions this 
quickly resulted in a break-up of the banks along ‘national lines’ and, therefore, 
a de facto rollback of their transnationalization. In other words, despite decades 
of European economic and financial integration, once the going gets tough a 
simplistic throwback to economic nationalism seems to be the only available 
response. As a consequence, some earlier tendencies in research on financial 
centres, whereby it was at least implicitly suggested that financial integration 
heralded the ‘end of geography’ may need a complete rethink. At the same 
time, the renewed role of states may well be exaggerated. With regulators 
pushing banks to increase capital, there has been feverish issuance activity in 
the capital markets, and this has often occurred through government capital 
injections. However, The Banker (2009) observes that even when government 
capital is removed from the calculations, the overall picture of rising and 
declining banks (and therefore IBCs) is not drastically altered as the banks own 
efforts to increase their capital were often sufficient to level most of the 
disruptions brought about by the financial crisis. In any case, future research on 
IBCs and financial centres will, once again, have to come to terms with the – 
potentially revamped – role of territorial states. 
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Second, the financial crisis and its often disrupting effects on IBCs and financial 
centres provide the ideal background for research that tries to make sense of 
the patterns outlined in this paper. Faulconbridge (2004), for instance, has 
criticized earlier research on financial geographies because of its preoccupation 
with attribute properties (e.g. financial turnover, number of banks, etc.) (see also 
Faulconbridge et al. 2007; Engelen and Grote 2009). Obviously, our analysis 
has been based on the interpretation of such indicators, and this means that a 
lot more research needs to be done to make sense of the processes behind 
these patterns of growth and decline. This will only be possible if, as 
Faulconbridge (2004) explains in his treatise on the London/Frankfurt financial 
relations, one conceptualizes cities as part of a relational financial network. Key 
dimensions of shifting financial geographies such as the 
complementarity/competition between cities and the ability of key actors to 
influence the financial network from a distance need to be put centre stage if 
one wishes to develop a deeper understanding of shifting financial geographies 
(e.g. Beaverstock et al. 2001; Poon 2003). 
 
Third, the poor showing of Manama highlighted in this paper contradicts the 
strong performance of a number of its key financial institutions that largely 
operate beyond the remit of ‘classical’ finance (see Bassens et al. 2010). 
Recent research on financial geographies has suggested that much more 
attention should be paid to this existence of ‘other’, ‘non-mainstream’ circuits of 
financial intermediation and accumulation (Pollard and Samers 2007). For 
instance, the double-digit growth of the ‘Islamic financial sector’ in the last few 
years has challenged the idea that the rise of financial centres in the Gulf region 
can simply be understood as the result of the dissemination of Western 
capitalist practices. Although some processes and events in this region may 
well lend themselves to such an interpretation, it denies the rather 
commonsensical observation that globalization, financialization and 
urbanization in this part of the world have been increasingly mediated through 
Islam. Although the Islamic financial sector has also suffered from credit 
shortage, Bassens et al. (2010) suggest that it has been affected less than 
mainstream financial institutions. It is quite possible that Manama’s poor 
showing in our analysis may in part be the result of the fact that capital has 
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been pouring into ‘other’ types of financial products that are not adequately 
reflected by The Banker’s data. For one thing, the credit crisis emphasizes the 
relevance of research on financial geographies that have long stayed under the 
radar because of the disproportionate focus on traditional financial institutions 
and the financial centres in which they are located. 
 
This overview of research agendas implies that a number of key issues have 
not been addressed in this short empirical paper. Furthermore, the financial 
crisis is obviously not an ‘event’ that can be isolated in time and space, but 
rather it is part of an on-going bundle of processes that is economic 
globalization. This means that the patterns we have identified may be 
deepened, altered or perhaps even be reversed in the coming years. Although it 
is hard to predict which of these future scenarios will come to pass, we do know 
that we will not be able to assess such changes unless we have a good 
empirical understanding of the shifting financial and wider corporate landscape 
(Taylor et al. 2009 2010). 
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Notes 
 
                                                            
1 As one of the reviewers pointed out, this is especially true for large multinational banks from 
small open trading economies like the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
 
2 For an earlier analysis of major IBCs with data from The Banker, see for example Choi et al. 
(2003). 
 
3 The data solely relate to a firm’s banking activities. In the case of bancassurance groups, for 
instance, the data reflect the banking business only.     
 
4 For Tier 1 capital, for instance, The Banker follows the guidelines put forward by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS).  
 
5 Likewise, improving solvability can be a sign of strength but also of weakness if it is the result 
of state capital injections.  
 
6 We have taken a very restrictive stance in this exercise: our goal was not to recast cities into 
city-regions but to rectify data errors. Thus many small cities in Switzerland, Germany and the 
US are still listed individually.  
